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1. Introduction 
In September 2007, Northern Rock, one of the most significant retail and commercial banking 
institutions in UK and a substantial mortgage lender, after being largely affected by the problems 
in credit markets triggered by the U.S. subprime crisis, sought for a liquidity support facility with 
the purpose to replace money market funding. Due to the systemic importance of Northern Rock 
and in order to prevent the negative effects that its failure might have had on the entire system, 
Bank of England took the decision to extend a loan facility to the distressed institution. By 
January 2008, Northern Rock had borrowed more than $25 billion from the Bank of England. A 
month later and after the inability of Northern Rock to find a commercial buyer that would 
commit to repay taxpayers’ money, the bank was eventually nationalised by the British 
government. 
     The financial aid provided to Northern Rock has been officially recorded as the first bank 
bailout after the eruption of the subprime mortgage crisis in August 2007. This was the prelude 
of a series of far-reaching and urgent rescue efforts that occurred in the global financial services 
industry during the late 2000s financial crisis. Indeed, in October 2008, the U.S. federal 
government launched the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to offer 
emergency financial support to corporate firms but, most importantly, to banking institutions 
which were teetering on the edge of failure. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the largest U.S. 
banks together with a number of smaller counterparts almost immediately agreed to participate in 
TARP. In Europe, a series of bailouts of some widely-known banking organisations also took 
place after the beginning of the crisis. The Swiss UBS, the three major Icelandic commercial 
banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki), the Danish Ebh Bank and the Roskilde Bank, the 
Dexia and the Fortis from Benelux countries are just some of the bailed out European banking 
companies. Apparently the key purpose of all the aforementioned rescue efforts was for national 
authorities to avert the sudden collapse of troubled institutions. But even more importantly, bank 
bailout policies were aiming at maintaining the stability of the system and containing systemic 
risk in financial markets. 
     Nevertheless, as it is almost always the case, every coin has two sides. On 28 September 
2007, NetBank, a savings-and-loan bank located in the State of Georgia in U.S., was shut down 
by the federal regulatory authorities mainly due to excessive mortgage defaults. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took receivership of the failed bank and all insured 
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deposit accounts (of up to $100,000) were transferred to an assuming institution. NetBank thus 
became the first banking firm to fail due to the mortgage market problems. Some days later, on 4 
October 2007, Miami Valley Bank was also hit by the credit crunch and shut down by the U.S. 
authorities. The collapse of Miami Valley Bank was followed by those of Douglas National 
Bank and Hume Bank in early 2008. Importantly, the number of U.S. bank failures increased 
rapidly from 2008 onwards. In total, for the period starting from early September 2007 and 
extending to the early days of 2013, there have been recorded 468 bank collapses in U.S. and the 
FDIC has been appointed receiver of all those bankrupt institutions. The losses from these 
failures in U.S. have been estimated to exceed the amount of $90 billion. By the same token, a 
number of banks in Europe and elsewhere were either failed, or nationalised during the crisis 
thus inflicting substantial losses on European governments and tax payers.   
     According to the above discussion, the U.S. federal authorities as well as the European and 
other national authorities worldwide have provided substantial financial support to several -
mostly large- banking organisations whilst, at the same time, have let many others to go 
bankrupt, the vast majority of them being small banks. This non-uniform policy raises a series of 
important questions: are some particular institutions considered important and big enough to save 
-or alternatively ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ (TBTF)- by the authorities in the sense that a collapse of any 
of them is very likely to trigger contagious defaults in the entire banking network, whereas some 
others are perceived as being ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’ (TSTS) in that their failure has no 
material impact on their counterparts, let alone on the system as a whole? Are, indeed, the size 
and the systemic importance of financial institutions the fundamental factors that make the 
authorities to treat them differently, or it is that the collapsed banks lag behind in terms of 
performance? To put it differently, is it that the authorities are reluctant to help some of the 
problem banks to stay afloat because they consider them as being TSTS, or these banks are (also) 
of so poor performance that are not capable of withstanding any serious shocks whatsoever? 
And, further, is there any particular threshold size below which a bank is very likely to fail in 
case of a banking crisis or in times of a financial turmoil? In other words, what is the threshold 
size (if any) below which a banking firm is viewed as being TSTS by regulatory authorities? 
     In this paper, we focus on the U.S. banking industry and make an attempt to provide concrete 
answers to all the aforementioned questions, which have never been examined in the burgeoning 
crisis literature. In fact, a large part of this literature is focused on Systemically Important 
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Financial Institutions (SIFIs) trying to explain their relevance in the propagation of the latest 
financial crisis. Hence, more research is clearly needed on the operation of small banking firms 
and their role in the functioning and the stability of the banking system. With this in mind, we 
collect data for the entire population of U.S. commercial and savings banks and categorise the 
sample banks in four distinct size groups: small, medium, large, and extra-large banks. We 
further construct three groups of banking institutions with respect to their soundness: healthy, 
failed, and assisted institutions via TARP. We, then, employ two different yet interrelated 
econometric models to test for any alterations in the overall performance and risk-taking 
behaviour amongst the different bank groups taking into account the above-mentioned size 
classification. A third model which defines a threshold size below which a banking firm is 
viewed as not being resilient to shocks is employed in our analysis to examine the validity of our 
TSTS hypothesis.  
    Our empirical analysis shows that size is a key determinant of performance and risk-taking 
behaviour of banks. More specifically, we demonstrate that smaller banks perform poorly 
compared to their larger counterparts and take higher risk. We report positive linear and non-
linear effects of size on bank performance and risk-taking, where the non-linear effects are found 
to be stronger. Along the same lines, we show that when banks grow in size, this has a further 
positive impact on their performance and risk profile. Overall, a long-run positive relationship 
between size and performance is documented regardless of the level of bank soundness (healthy 
vs. failed and assisted banks) under examination. We further show that the decision of 
supervisory and regulatory authorities to let a bank fail seems to be influenced by the bank’s 
absolute size and whether this falls below some particular threshold level. Indeed, we lend 
support to our TSTS hypothesis according to which the impact of bank performance on failure 
probability strongly depends on bank size. 
     The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of bank size in the 
literature. The aim of this Section is not to provide an extensive review of the past and current 
literature; rather, its key purpose is to present how size is intertwined with the operation of 
banks, discuss the relevance of bank size in the crisis literature, and indicate the literature gaps 
that our study aims to fill. Section 3 presents in detail the data set and the variables which are 
employed in the empirical analysis. The econometric models are sketched out in Section 4, 
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where the estimation results are also discussed. Section 5 is devoted to robustness checks, 
whereas Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The importance of size in the banking literature 
In September 1984, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in U.S. made, for the 
first time, a public distinction between systemically and non-systemically important banking 
institutions. It announced that the biggest eleven from a total of approximately 14,000 banks that 
were in operation at that time were considered as TBTF and as such they would be offered full 
deposit insurance, whereas all the other banks would remain only partially covered. After that 
announcement, numerous studies have turned to investigate the operation of large, systemically 
important financial organisations. Some of the most prominent examples in this early TBTF 
literature are those of O’Hara and Shaw (1990), Boyd and Runkle (1993), Demsetz and Strahan 
(1997), and Galloway et al. (1997).  
     A significant part of the current banking literature which has been sparked by the emergence 
of the recent financial crisis has also focused its interest on the relevance of TBTF banks in the 
propagation of the crisis and its subsequent dissemination throughout the global economy. For 
instance, Huang et al. (2009) construct a framework for measuring and stress testing the systemic 
risk of 12 U.S. major commercial and investment banks; Adrian and Shin (2010) examine the 
procyclicality in leverage of the 5 biggest U.S. investment banks before the outbreak of crisis; 
Papanikolaou and Wolff (2013) focus on 20 U.S. systemically important Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) to study how modern banking that gave birth to the off-balance-sheet 
leverage activities affected the risk profile of these banks as well as the level of systemic risk 
before and after the onset of the crisis; lastly, Patro et al. (2013) uses the 22 largest commercial 
and investment banks in U.S. to analyse the relevance of stock return correlations in assessing 
the level of systemic risk.  
     Size has been introduced in the extant banking literature not only in absolute terms, but also 
in relative terms. There are indeed several studies that discuss the substantial differences which 
exist between the business operation and the performance of large banking firms with those of 
their smaller peers. For instance, size has been found to be amongst the key factors in the 
decision of a bank to follow some specific business model. Focusing on the U.S. banking market 
and distinguishing banks in different size clusters, DeYoung et al. (2004) claim that the 
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deregulation process and the technological changes of the ’80s and the ’90s gave birth to two 
main bank size groups. The first group consists of big banks, whose operation is characterised by 
the use of ‘hard’ information, impersonal relationships with their customers, low unit costs, and 
standardised loans. The second group contains small banks, which collect and make use of ‘soft’ 
information, develop more personal relations with their customers, face higher unit costs, offer 
non-standardised loans, and provide the bulk of financing to small business firms.  
     In line with DeYoung et al. (2004), Carter and McNulty (2005) document an inverse 
relationship between the size of banking firms and the net return on small business lending, 
suggesting that smaller banks perform better than larger banks in the relevant loan market. On 
the other hand, larger banks are found to have an advantage in credit card lending, a market 
characterised by impersonal relationships and standardised loans. In a similar vein, Berger et al. 
(2005) find that small banks have a comparative advantage in making loans based on ‘soft’ 
information. This happens because of the different sets of incentives in the organisational 
structures of small and large banks. 
     Large banking organisations are generally found to be engaged in a very broad range of 
activities -other than traditional banking activities like loan granting and deposit taking- 
compared to their smaller peers. The study of Rime and Stiroh (2003) show that big banks are 
indeed very prone to the so-called ‘universal activities’ in contrast to small and mid-sized 
institutions, which are less diversified and resemble single-line businesses. These activities, 
which are mainly market-based, are explicitly defined by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
in the U.S. banking market, and include -among others- securities dealing and underwriting, 
insurance underwriting, financial and investment advisory services, merchant banking, and 
issuing or selling securitised interests in bank-eligible assets. 
     As seen from the above discussion, size is found to be a crucial determinant of banks’ overall 
performance in the relevant literature. Banks of different sizes follow diverse business models, 
which are related to various levels of risk, increased or reduced earnings, higher or lower failure 
probabilities and so forth. Notwithstanding the fact that this sort of variations in the operation of 
banks has been well-documented in the extant literature, the burgeoning crisis literature, within 
which our study falls, does not appear to have paid the necessary attention to them. Rather, crisis 
literature is greatly concerned with the relevance of large and systemically important financial 
institutions in the emergence and the spread of the crisis. Accordingly, in the current paper, we 
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make an attempt to fill this void by examining the performance of banks of different sizes in the 
recent crisis from various perspectives. Most importantly, we shed more light on the role of 
small banking institutions and the weight they carry for the system.  
 
3. The data set  
3.1. Description 
The bank balance sheet data we employ in our empirical analysis are of quarterly frequency and 
extend from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2012. We do not examine the years before 2002 
for two main reasons. First, the two international financial crises which erupted in East Asia and 
in Russia at the end of the ’90s combined with the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
crisis of 1998 both had a destabilising impact on the U.S. banking system. Second, no 
considerable regulatory or other similar reforms occurred in the U.S. banking market after 2002, 
meaning that the operation of banks remained largely unaffected by exogenous factors 
throughout the examined period. In fact, the latest legislative activity in the U.S. that largely 
influenced the operation of the entire banking sector was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 
which opened up the local market allowing commercial and investment banks, and securities 
firms and insurance companies to merge their activities. If any further reforms had taken place in 
the banking regulatory environment after 2002, it would be very likely to have biased our results; 
indeed, it is well established in the relevant literature that regulation strongly affects industry 
structure and alters the behaviour of banks in terms of performance and risk-taking (see, for 
example, Brissimis et al., 2008).1  
     The bank data we employ in our empirical analysis have been hand-collected from the 
website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and that of the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC). We begin with a total of 8,905 U.S. commercial and savings 
banking institutions that filed a Report on Condition and Income (widely known as Call Report) 
in the first quarter of 2002, that is, in 2002q1. Due to failures, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
that took place during the sample period but, mainly, after the onset of the crisis in mid-2007, the 
total number of active commercial and savings banks in the U.S. was reduced to 7,581 in 
                                                 
1 It has to be mentioned at this point that the U.S. government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in mid-2002 with the 
purpose to set new or enhanced disclosure standards for all U.S. public company boards including those of banking 
firms. However, that Act had a partial effect on the operation of the banking industry as it only targeted the listed 
banks; further, it was introduced in the very beginning of our sample period implying that its overall impact is (most 
likely) reflected in our data. 
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2012q4. It is important to mention here that we do not consider any savings associations (i.e., 
thrifts) in our analysis as they file a different regulatory report (the Thrift Financial Report) 
compared to the Call Report filed by commercial and savings banks. In addition, de novo banks, 
defined as banks less than five years old, are dropped from our sample because the operating 
behaviour and the characteristics of this sort of banks have been found to be substantially 
different from those of banks in operation for longer periods of time.2 Moreover, banks which 
belong to the 1% and 99% percentiles of the size distribution are not considered in our sample. 
After checking the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies (missing, negative or zero 
values), we obtain an unbalanced panel of 340,076 observations corresponding to N = 7,729 
banks. 
 
3.2. Classification of banks on the basis of their soundness 
We identify all the U.S. commercial and savings banks which either failed or received financial 
assistance during the recent financial meltdown. To begin with, failed banks are defined as the 
insured institutions that have been closed requiring disbursements by FDIC. For the period 
starting in early September 2007 and extending to the end of December 2012, there have been 
recorded 468 bank collapses in U.S. and FDIC has been appointed receiver of all the bankrupt 
institutions. From this number, a total of 450 refer to failures of commercial and savings banking 
institutions, whereas the rest 18 failures concern thrifts which, as already noted, are not included 
in our sample.3 To give the broad picture of the extent of bank failures in the recent crisis, we 
mention that only 25 banking institutions went bankrupt in the U.S. from 2000 to the beginning 
of the crisis. All the relevant information on bank failures is collected from the FDIC website. 
     We would like to clarify that the set of failed banks we construct does not contain Lehmann 
Brothers which also declared bankruptcy during the crisis and, more specifically, in September 
2008. The reason for this exclusion is twofold: first, Lehmann Brothers was an investment bank 
and as such it was neither supervised from, nor insured by FDIC; and, second, this has been the 
biggest bank failure in the history of U.S. and is thus treated as an outlier in our study and is 
omitted from our data sample. For similar reasons, Bear Sterns & Company, American 
                                                 
2 For further analysis on this issue, see, e.g., DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and DeYoung (2003). 
3 The names of the banks, the distribution of banks across the U.S. states and cities, the date that every failed 
institution ceased to exist as a privately-held going concern entity, the estimated assets and deposits of each 
institution at the time of failure, and the cost of every individual failure for FDIC are all available upon request. 
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International Group (AIG), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are also excluded from our sample.  
     Turning now to the assisted institutions of our sample, these refer to the banks which received 
some funding via TARP. The relevant list of TARP recipients is obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Treasury. We use this list to trace all commercial and savings banks which 
participated in TARP either directly, or through their parent (holding) firms. However, neither 
Bank Holding Companies nor Financial Holding Companies that received money from TARP 
are taken into consideration in our analysis, as this is not undertaken at a holding company level. 
In total, we are capable of tracing 824 TARP-funded banking firms in the U.S.4  
     Together with the above-described sets of failed and assisted banking companies, we also 
construct a third one which plays the role of the control sample in our econometric analysis and 
consists of all the healthy U.S. commercial and savings banks. Healthy institutions are those that 
neither failed nor received a financial aid during the crisis. From a statistical perspective, the sets 
of failed and rescued banks as described above do not intersect with each other in the sense that 
none of the sample banks that received financial assistance did later fail. Apparently this also 
holds true for the set of healthy banks and those of failed and bailed out banks.  
    
3.3. Size classification of banks  
As earlier discussed, our sample consists of the whole range of banks in terms of size. In Section 
2, we took a literature-based approach to show how size influences the decisions of bank owners 
and managers regarding the activities, the performance and the risk-taking profile of banks. To 
control for the effects of size on the different business models that our sample banks have 
adopted and which have a considerable impact on their overall performance, we follow Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) and split our sample into four separate size clusters denoted by the lower-
case letter k. We define small banks as those banks with total assets up to $1 billion (k = 1); this 
definition of small banks conforms to the usual notion of community banks in U.S. We further 
define medium-sized banks with total assets between $1 billion and $3 billion (k = 2), large 
banks with total assets from $3 billion to $10 billion (k = 3), and extra-large banks as all those 
institutions with more than $10 billion in total assets (k = 4).  
                                                 
4 The detailed list of these banks is also available upon request.  
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Table 1 
Size classification of banks. This table presents the four separate size groups into which the sample of 
banks is divided.  
Size cluster (k) Bank size Bank Total Assets 
1 Small banks Up to $1 billion 
2 Medium banks Between $1 billion and $3 billion 
3 Large banks Between $3 billion and $10 billion 
4 Extra-large banks More than $10 billion 
 
3.4. Sample characteristics 
We can now proceed to discuss the characteristics of the sample banks on the basis of the above-
described classifications. Although there are several thousands of banking firms in the U.S. 
market, the banks with total assets that account for more than $10 billion constitute only the 
0.7% of the entire bank population; yet, on average, they hold more than 60% of total bank 
assets. On the other hand, the institutions with less than $1billion of assets account for 78% of 
banks, but all banks in this size category only hold about 12% of total assets. Large and extra-
large banks hold together a market share which is equal to 76% of the entire U.S. banking 
industry. 
     To continue, small bank failures account for 83% of total failures during the crisis, while the 
rescues of large and extra-large banks account for 93% of total rescues. An exception of an 
extra-large bank with more than $300 billion of assets which was not saved by the authorities 
and declared insolvent was that of Washington Mutual Bank. This Bank was the sixth largest 
U.S. commercial bank when it failed in September 2008; Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, 
Wachovia Bank, Citibank, and Wells Fargo Bank were those five institutions with more assets 
than Washington Mutual Bank. In fact, no other commercial or savings banking organisation 
with more than $100 billion of total assets went bankrupt during the crisis. On the other hand, the 
smallest failed bank held approximately $10 million of assets. 
     As regards the business models followed by the sample banks, business lending accounts for 
the substantial majority of loans for large and, especially, for extra-large banks. In contrast, small 
and medium-sized banks have been mainly involved with housing loans. In addition, extra-large 
banks obtain more than 67% of their purchased funds from abroad. Moreover, the relative use of 
core deposits (checkable, savings, and time deposits) shrinks with bank size, while the relative 
use of money market instruments like, for instance, derivatives and securitised assets, increases 
with size. These explain why the Net Interest Margin (NIM) measured as the difference between 
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Total interest income and Total interest expense divided by the interest-bearing assets is lower 
for large and extra-large banks. Correspondingly, non-interest income and non-interest expense 
are found to be lower for both small and medium-sized banks. 
     Based on the geographical characteristics of our data set, we note that extra-large as well as 
large banking firms are headquartered and located in terms of branching activity near salt water, 
that is, near the East and West Coasts of the U.S. On the other hand, small and medium-sized 
banks tend to concentrate their activity in the mainland and, more specifically, in states like 
Iowa, Nebraska, and Utah. As regards the distribution of failures, the states of Arizona, 
California, Georgia, and Nevada are amongst those with the highest number of bankruptcies. 
Most of the Northeastern and Southeastern states (excluding California) had either no or a few 
bank failures, whereas the Western U.S. states, which experienced a relatively larger decline in 
economic performance as measured by the GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate, had the 
highest bank failure rates. The converse holds true for bank bailouts: the vast majority of banking 
institutions that received some financial aid via TARP are headquartered in the eastern part of 
U.S. 
 
3.5. CAMEL ratings 
The bank performance variable we employ in our empirical analysis relies on the CAMEL rating 
system, which is utilised by the U.S. regulatory authorities to monitor the conditions in the 
banking industry. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as CAMEL, was 
introduced by the U.S. authorities in November 1979 to conduct on-site examinations of bank 
safety and soundness. CAMEL is a vector of five different measures capturing Capital adequacy, 
Asset quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, and Liquidity. In 1996, CAMEL 
evolved into CAMELS, with the addition of a sixth component (‘S’) that summarises the 
Sensitivity to market risk. U.S. regulators resort to CAMELS every 12 to 18 months; they assign 
a score on a scale of 1 (best) to 5 (worst) for each of the six CAMELS components. The six 
components are thereafter combined to generate a composite rating for each bank. Banks with 
composite ratings of 1 or 2 raise few, if any, supervisory concerns; on the other hand, banks with 
ratings of 3, 4, or 5 present moderate to extreme degrees of supervisory concern. 
     We construct a set of financial variables that largely resemble the components of the original 
CAMEL system. The ‘Sensitivity to market risk’ component is not considered in our analysis, 
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because the majority of our sample banks are not significantly engaged in market activity. As 
earlier discussed, it is mainly the large banking organisations which are heavily involved with 
market-based products and services and are therefore influenced by market interest rate risk. We 
use the equity-to-assets ratio as an indicator of bank capital strength (CAP1); asset quality is 
captured by the provisions for credit losses divided by total loans and leases (CREDLOSS1); the 
quality of bank management is proxied by total operating income as a fraction of income 
generating assets (MNGEXP1), which is a typical measure of operating efficiency in the banking 
literature (see, e.g., Lane et al., 1986); the return on assets (ROA) is applied as a measure of 
earnings strength, whereas the ratio of cash & cash equivalents and federal funds sold and 
securities purchased under agreements to repurchase to total assets reflects the degree of bank 
liquidity (LQDT1). To develop the five ratios, we use bank balance sheet data collected from 
Call Reports. Appendix A summarises the CAMEL components and their data sources.  
     The two tables that follow report the results of simple univariate analyses of mean differences 
between the failed (Table 2a) and the rescued (Table 2b) sample banks with the healthy 
institutions. In these tables, we present the means and standard deviations of the five CAMEL 
components and calculate the differences in their means.  
      
     Table 2a 
Univariate analysis. This table reports the results of a simple univariate analysis of mean 
differences between failed and healthy banks for all five CAMEL components. The description 
of each component together with the relevant data sources are provided in Appendix A. The 
values of a t-test which captures the statistical differences in the means of failed and healthy 
banks are reported in the last column of the table. 
    Failed banks Healthy banks   
         (N=438)     (N=6,488) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-stat 
Variables Mean Stdev Mean Stdev   
CAP1 0.081 0.751 0.117 0.152 -0.036 -7.89*** 
CREDLOSS1 0.029 0.619 0.008 0.241  0.021  8.10*** 
MNGEXP1 0.008 0.126 0.012 0.061 -0.004 -1.84** 
ROA 0.007 0.260 0.015 0.201 -0.008 -4.69*** 
LQDT1 0.013 0.024 0.027 0.014 -0.014 -1.89** 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed test 
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     Table 2b 
Univariate analysis. This table reports the results of a simple univariate analysis of mean 
differences between bailed out and healthy banks for all five CAMEL components. The 
description of each component together with the relevant data sources are provided in Appendix 
A. The values of a t-test which captures the statistical differences in the means of failed and 
healthy banks are reported in the last column of the table. 
    Bailed out banks Healthy banks   
         (N=803)     (N=6,488) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
t-stat 
Variables Mean Stdev Mean Stdev   
CAP1 0.090 0.751 0.117 0.152 -0.027 -6.94*** 
CREDLOSS1 0.009 0.310 0.008 0.241  0.001  1.29 
MNGEXP1 0.014 0.297 0.012 0.061  0.002  1.50 
ROA 0.011 0.391 0.015 0.201 -0.004 -1.91** 
LQDT1 0.022 0.034 0.027 0.014 -0.005 -1.72* 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed test 
 
     We start by discussing the results in Table 2a. We document that, during the sample period, 
the mean differences are highly significant for all the examined variables. For instance, the 
capital ratio (CAP1) is 8.1% and 11.7% for failed and for healthy banking firms respectively and 
the difference in means between the two groups of banks (which is equal to 3.6%) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. We also report that the provisions for credit losses (CREDLOSS1) are 
higher for failed banks by 2.1% and that this difference is again statistically important at the 1% 
level. Markedly, the signs of the reported differences of CAMEL components are all the 
anticipated ones. That is, failed banks have significantly lower capital buffers, the loans and 
leases of these banks are riskier compared to those of their healthy counterparts, their managerial 
performance (MNGEXP1) is significantly worse, their profitability (ROA) is inferior, and, lastly, 
institutions that declared default hold less liquid assets in their portfolios (LQDT1). 
     Table 2b reports the results of the univariate analysis for the explanatory variables between 
the banks that received financial assistance via TARP and the banks which stayed afloat during 
the crisis and up to the very end of 2012. As we can see, it is only the differences in means for 
the capital ratio (CAP1) and for profitability (ROA) which are statistically significant at the 1% 
level: the reported mean differences are equal to 2.7% and 0.4%, respectively. Additionally, the 
difference in means between the two examined groups of banks is statistically significant at 10% 
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for the liquidity variable (LQDT1), whereas the mean differences for the other two CAMEL 
components -that is, CREDLOSS1 and MNGEXP1- are not significant at any conventional 
confidence level.  
 
4. The regression analysis 
4.1. The performance-risk-size nexus in banking 
Our first step is to explore the bank performance-risk-size nexus controlling for the impact of 
geographical characteristics. As earlier shown, this sort of characteristics is strongly related with 
the overall bank performance and the level of bank soundness. The model we initially employ in 
our empirical analysis relies on a data set which consists of the universe of 7,729 U.S. 
commercial and savings banks and extends from 2002q1 to 2012q4. The model specification is 
as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿����������𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑎𝑗𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑏𝑘𝑑𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                (1) 
 
where  𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a dummy for the U.S. state j (j = 1, 2, …, 50); 𝑑𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is a dummy for the size class 
k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4);  𝑎𝑗 is a state-specific intercept; and 𝑏𝑘is a slope coefficient that depends only on 
size class and is assumed to be identical across the U.S. states. The index i stands for the number 
of sample banks: i = 1, 2, 3, …., N. For each bank i, we average CAMEL ratings over the sample 
period. The reason of doing this is twofold: first, CAMEL ratings are based on accounting and 
not on market value measures. Accounting data, however, are intentionally smoothed meaning 
that bank managers have some short-run discretion when they report gains and losses. By time-
averaging CAMEL scores, the degree of discrepancy between the accounting and market 
measures tends to decline. Second, as previously mentioned, several banks drop out of the 
sample over time due to failures and also due to M&As. Omitting these banks from the 
regression analysis is likely to bias our estimates. Again, this problem is addressed by averaging 
CAMEL for each banking organisation over its lifetime. It is important to mention at this point 
that, as earlier discussed, a lower composite CAMEL rating indicates superior performance. 
Therefore, CAMEL is introduced with a negative sign in eq. 1 to avoid any confusion in the 
interpretation of the regression results. 
     The null hypothesis we test is that bank size is not important for performance and risk-taking: 
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𝐻0: the slope coefficients on bank size are equal to zero for every size class 
 
If 𝐻0 is true, then the state dummies capture all -or at least most- of the explanatory power of the 
model. 
     As shown in Table 3 below, we normalise the coefficient on the Medium dummy variable. In 
the same context, one of the state dummies included in eq. 1 is also normalised to zero. 
According to the regression results, we can easily reject 𝐻0, which implies that, as expected, size 
is an important determinant of the performance and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. 
Crucially, the coefficients on size dummies increase monotonically moving up from the smallest 
size class to the largest size class. An analysis of this result indicates that, by and large, smaller 
banks show an inferior performance relative to their larger counterparts. We can thus postulate 
that small-sized banking enterprises may not be in a position to fully and productively exploit the 
technological developments and operate under increased scale and scope economies. Admittedly, 
the technological advances of the recent decades, combined with the changes in the business 
models of large banking institutions and the growth of non-bank financial services providers, 
have made it more difficult for smaller banks to attract new customers, or even to retain the 
existing ones. In fact, small, community banking firms have lost business to larger financial 
institutions with relatively low cost structures in the years preceding the crisis.  
     To continue, smaller banks may not have the capacity to efficiently diversify the different 
types of risk they face. For instance, community banks typically carry a relatively high degree of 
credit risk for three main reasons. First, they tend to have fewer loan customers and this makes 
them more vulnerable to loan defaults thus increasing their idiosyncratic risk. Second, the 
activities of the majority of community banks in U.S. are geographically concentrated to a 
considerable extent. Although by lending to firms and households located in the same 
geographical region community banks can develop long-term relationships that can contribute to 
the better screening and monitoring of their borrowers, a high degree of geographical 
concentration implies that borrowers are influenced by the same (more or less) economic and 
financial conditions. By contrast, large banking organisations with branches spread over a wide 
geographic area can reap the benefits of this diversification as economic environments are hardly 
perfectly correlated. Accordingly, the level of market risk tends to be higher for smaller banking 
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companies like community banks. And, third, community banks compete with larger banks 
which have greater opportunities to diversify risk through the broad scale and the variety of the 
products they offer.  
     To sum up, we document that the smaller a bank is, the lower its performance and the riskier 
its portfolio. Importantly, we do not report any considerable changes in our findings if, instead of 
the coefficient on the Medium dummy variable, we normalise the coefficients on any of the other 
three size dummies. 
Table 3 
Bank performance-risk-size nexus: regression 
results. This table presents the estimated coefficients 
of the bank size dummy variable for all four size 
categories k (i.e., Small, Medium, Large, and Extra-
large) based on eq. 1. The dependent variable is 
bank performance (CAMEL), which is composed of 
bank capital strength (CAP1), asset quality 
(CREDLOSS1), the quality of bank management 
(MNGEXP1), earnings strength (ROA), and bank 
liquidity (LQDT1). A description of each variable 
and the relevant data sources are included in 
Appendix A. White robust standard errors are used 
to correct for heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  
 
Size Coeff. 
Value (𝒃𝒌) 
 
t-stat 
Bank size (k)   
Small 0.21 2.04*** 
Medium 0.00  
Large 0.54 1.91** 
Extra-large 0.73 2.32*** 
   
Obs (N) 7,729  
 𝑅2 0.11  
F-statistics 13.43  
                                        ***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of  
                                        significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
     Since a clear link has been established between size, performance, and risk-taking in the 
operation of the U.S. banking industry, we can now proceed to further scrutinise the examined 
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relationship. To this purpose, we follow Boyd and Runkle (1993) and De Nicoló (2000) and 
construct a model which is consistent with the notion of long-run equilibrium: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +𝛼5𝛨𝛨𝛪𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝑅1𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (2) 
 
     The dependent variable of eq. 2 is again given by the CAMEL scores of the sample 
institutions, with the exception that this time CAMEL is not averaged out over the sample period. 
Moreover, like we did in eq. 1, we also introduce CAMEL with a negative sign in eq. 2 to avoid 
any misinterpretation of the empirical results. Regarding the right-hand side variables, we make 
a clear distinction between a bank’s absolute size (SIZE) and its systemic size (SYSTSIZE). SIZE 
is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. The measurement of 
SYSTSIZE relies on the relevant definition found in the ‘Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act’ (the Dodd-Frank Act). This Act, which passed in July 2010, aims to prohibit 
consolidations in the banking industry which result in banks with total liabilities exceeding 10 
percent of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all the firms in the industry. In other words, 
one of the main purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act is to prevent the emergence of oversized 
banking organisations. Hence, SYSTSIZE is measured by each sample bank’s liabilities-to-GDP 
ratio (see Bertay et al. 2013). To account for possible nonlinearities, we include the squared term 
of SIZE, i.e. SIZESQ. We also control for differences in the growth rate of banks’ size by 
incorporating the term SIZEGR in our model. The sum of the coefficients on SIZE, SIZESQ, and 
SIZEGR gives us the net effect of a permanent change in bank size on CAMEL. In other words, it 
captures the notion of long-run equilibrium.  
     Following the relevant literature (see Leary, 2009 and Buch et al., 2013), all four size 
variables in eq. 2 are lagged by one quarter to address possible endogeneity and simultaneity 
concerns between CAMEL and bank size. Admittedly, selecting the number of lags to be smaller 
than the correct one may distort the size of the estimation tests. On the other hand, selecting 
orders greater than the correct one is likely to result in a significant loss of explanatory power. 
Therefore, the lag structure of our size variables is determined by two of the most popular model 
selection criteria, namely the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion. 
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     We measure the degree of market concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
using bank total deposits as the input variable. HHI is calculated as the sum of squares of the 
market share of each bank included in our sample: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 = ∑ (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑞2𝑁𝑖=1            (3) 
 
Eq. (3) relies on the market share of bank i in quarter q where N is the total number of banks in 
the examined U.S. market. The index ranges from 0 to 10,000, where zero indicates a market 
with an infinite number of banks and 10,000 shows a market with just a single banking firm. 
HHI is a static measure in the sense that it estimates market concentration at some particular 
point in time q. 
     Additionally, we control for the possible impact of M&As by introducing a dummy variable 
in our model (MA), which is equal to unity in the quarter q that bank i was involved in some 
M&A transaction. For example, if a transaction occurred on, say, April 15 2008, then this 
transaction is recorded in the second quarter of 2008, meaning that the binary variable MA takes 
the value of one in 2008q2. To construct MA, we resort to the relevant information provided by 
the FFIEC. We also introduce a crisis dummy (CR1) to capture the impact of the crisis on the 
operation of banks. CR1 is set equal to 1 in 2007q3 and thereafter, since August of 2007 is 
generally accepted as the start date of the crisis. Specifically, that was the time when the TED 
spread, that is, the difference between the yield on three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the yield on three-month U.S.Treasury bills which is an indicator of credit risk, 
widened to almost 200 basis points relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points. 
Several recent studies in the banking literature have adopted the third quarter of 2007 as the 
starting point of the crisis in their empirical analyses (see, e.g., Cornett et al., 2011). The 
variations in the macroeconomic conditions amongst U.S. states are captured by the GDP output 
gap (GDP), which is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. All variables we use in eq. 2 and the sources utilised to construct them are 
summarised in Appendix A. 
     Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations among the dependent and the explanatory variables 
of eq. 2. As expected, the correlations between SIZE and SIZESQ are almost equal to unity. 
However, the correlation coefficients between other pairs of independent variables are in all 
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cases below 0.65, which suggests that multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem. 
Nevertheless, since collinearity may exist between more than two independent variables, we 
proceed to regress each of the independent variables of eq. 2 on all the other independent 
variables and then calculate the remaining terms, which are given by the so-called Variance-
Inflation Factors (VIFs). More concretely, VIFs represent a scaled version of the multiple-
correlation coefficients between one variable and the remainder of the independent variables. All 
VIFs are found to be far below the cutoff value of 10.00, which signifies the absence of serious 
multicollinearity that can distort our results.5 For the explanatory variables which are 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable of our model, the reported correlations are in 
the expected directions. To give an example, a significantly positive correlation between CAMEL 
and GDP is reported, showing that banks perform better under favourable economic conditions. 
More importantly, we observe that CAMEL is significantly correlated with all four size variables 
of eq.2 (i.e., SIZE, SIZESQ, SIZEGR, SYSTSIZE), and this evidence provides support for and 
further motivates our analysis.6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Gujarati (1995) for a discussion of ‘rule-of-thumb’ methods of detecting multicollinearity. Gujarati suggests 
that a VIF in excess of 10.00 would indicate a high degree of collinearity. 
6 The results of Pearson correlation analysis are confirmed by the use of Spearman correlation rank tests. 
                    Table 4 
Correlation matrix. This table contains the Pearson correlations between the dependent and the independent variables of eq. 
2. P-values are reported below the correlation coefficients. All variables and the sources utilised to construct them are 
included in Appendix A. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
CAMEL SIZE SIZESQ SIZEGR SYSTSIZE  HHI MA CR1 GDP 
CAMEL 1.00         
           
SIZE      0.65*** 1.00        
  0.00         
           
SIZESQ       0.64***       0.99*** 1.00       
  0.00 0.00        
           
SIZEGR      0.51**       0.58***       0.52*** 1.00      
  0.04 0.00  0.00       
          
SYSTSIZE      -0.57***     -0.22**     -0.24**  -0.10* 1.00     
 0.00  0.04  0.04 0.07      
          
HHI      0.45**   0.31*   0.30*   0.17*     -0.14 1.00    
  0.02 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.17     
           
MA      0.12**   0.25*   0.26*     0.37**     -0.09     0.14**     1.00   
  0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.26 0.03    
          
CR1    -0.39**  -0.41*  -0.42*    -0.63**     0.42**  -0.24*     -0.15      1.00  
 0.02 0.05 0.05  0.04 0.04 0.06      0.11   
           
GDP       0.32***      0.53**    0.52**     0.24**  -0.33*   0.29*      0.22     -0.18  1.00 
  0.00 0.04      0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08      0.12      0.24  
     To estimate eq. 2, we rely on the set of the above-described variables which are observable 
over time. Nonetheless, there might exist some unobserved variables which are likely to have an 
impact on the examined relationship and are not incorporated in our model. Omitted variables in 
general can be either constant over time, or time-dependent. Regardless of their time dimension, 
omitted variables are difficult, or sometimes impossible to be measured and be controlled for. If 
we search to find instrumental variables, or proxies, for the likely omitted variables, a series of 
rather strong assumptions which are hardly met in practice has to be made. Moreover, it is 
necessary to know how to correctly model each omitted variable’s influence on the dependent 
variable of the regression equation as well as the relationship that holds between the instruments 
and the possible omitted variables. Most importantly, it is very problematic to identify the 
specific variables which have been omitted from the regression model and are correlated with the 
main model variables thus producing flawed estimates. 
     We choose to introduce individual (bank-specific) fixed effects in our regression analysis to 
account for the influence of any time-invariant omitted variables. Fixed effects can indirectly 
control for these variables as they focus on within-bank variation. Suppose we have the 
following model in which Z stands for the vector of correlated time-invariant omitted variables: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (4) 
 
We compute the time group means and express eq. 4 in the form of averages:  
 
 𝑌𝚤� = 𝛼𝚤� + 𝛽′𝑋𝚤� + 𝛾′𝑍𝚤� + 𝜀𝚤�                  (5) 
 
If we subtract eq. 5 from eq. 4 we obtain: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝚤� = (𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝚤� ) + 𝛽′(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝚤� ) + 𝛾′(𝑍𝑖𝑡 − 𝑍𝚤� ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝚤�)         (6) 
 
And because 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝚤� , eq. 6 is reduced to: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝚤� = 𝛽′(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝚤� ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝚤�)              (7) 
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Since there is no variation in Z over the time frame of the regression, the vector of omitted 
variables drops out of the model as shown in eq. 7. 
     The fixed-effects model is more appropriate when differences across banks are deemed to be 
substantial, time-invariant, and correlated with the explanatory variables. The random-effects 
model, on the other hand, is appropriate when correlated omitted variables are not an issue to be 
considered. Given the potential for omitted variables bias and the importance of bank-specific 
effects in our model specification, we anticipate the fixed-effects approach to be the most 
appropriate one. Indeed, we can easily reject the use of random effects on the basis of the 
Hausman (1978) test. At standard levels of statistical significance (i.e., 1% and 5%), we reject 
the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients obtained from the two estimation methods 
are not significant. Accordingly, the fixed-effects model is our preferred estimator. 
     So far we have discussed how we address the problem of omitted variables which remain 
constant over time. However, as noted earlier, there is also the possibility of the estimated model 
parameters to suffer from bias which emerges from time-varying omitted variables. To correct 
for bias caused by such unobserved time-variant systematic factors (like, e.g., the level of interest 
rates) which may have an impact on the behaviour of banks over time, we include a vector of 
time fixed effects. Time fixed effects therefore capture the unobserved and the non-measurable 
time-varying characteristics of the likely omitted variables as well as of the variables included in 
eq. 2. In addition, we control for the differences in the banking environments amongst U.S. 
states, by incorporating state fixed effects in our regression. 
     We run three different regressions, one for each level of banking soundness, that is, one for 
the healthy institutions, another one for the failed ones, and a third one for the bailed out banks 
which received assistance via TARP during the crisis. The regression results are presented in the 
Table 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 5 
Bank performance-risk-size nexus: regression results. This table presents the estimation results of eq.2. 
The dependent variable is bank performance (CAMEL) which is composed of bank capital strength 
(CAP1), asset quality (CREDLOSS1), the quality of bank management (MNGEXP1), earnings strength 
(ROA), and bank liquidity (LQDT1). The main explanatory variables are: bank size (SIZE), bank size 
squared (SIZESQ), the growth of bank size (SIZEGR), and systemic bank size (SYSTSIZE). All four size 
variables are lagged by one quarter to address possible endogeneity and simultaneity concerns between 
performance and size. The set of control variables includes banking market concentration (HHI), a 
dummy variable (MA) which accounts for M&A transactions, a crisis dummy variable (CR1), and the 
level of economic growth (GDP). A description of each variable and the relevant data sources are 
included in Appendix A. Individual bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and state fixed effects are 
incorporated in the regression model. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported next to coefficient 
estimates. 
  Healthy Banks Failed banks Bailed out banks 
Variables Coef value t-stat Coef value t-stat Coef value t-stat 
constant  0.95  1.21 0.56  1.03  1.07  1.59* 
SIZE  0.82  1.87** 0.24  1.88**  1.12  1.91** 
SIZESQ  2.21  1.94** 1.69  1.86**  2.55  2.05*** 
SIZEGR  3.40  2.41*** 2.22  2.49***  4.73  3.11*** 
SYSTSIZE -1.15 -1.31 -1.07 -1.09 -2.15 -1.93** 
HHI  1.39  2.47***  1.87  1.92**   0.97  1.88** 
MA   0.67  1.86**  0.75  1.97***   1.02  2.09*** 
CR1 -1.87 -3.89*** -4.76 -4.98***  -2.71 -3.44*** 
GDP   2.98  3.45***  3.46  1.91**   3.02  2.90*** 
Obs (N) 6,488   438     803  
𝑅2 0.19   0.22     0.18  
Individual fixed 
effects Yes   Yes     Yes  
Time fixed 
effects Yes   Yes     Yes  
State fixed 
effects Yes   Yes     Yes  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
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     We observe that SIZE and SIZESQ enter with positive signs in all three regressions and that 
are both highly significant. That is, we report positive linear and nonlinear effects of size on bank 
performance for the three examined groups of banks. In fact, the nonlinear effects are found to be 
stronger compared to the linear effects, suggesting that the interrelationship between 
performance, risk, and size is highly nonlinear. We also document that when a bank grows in 
size, this has a further positive impact on its overall performance. This is to say, small banking 
firms lag behind in terms of performance, a result which has been earlier discussed in detail. In 
fact, bailed out banks are found to have stronger incentives to increase their asset size compared 
to the healthy and failed banks as shown by the higher coefficient value of SIZEGR on CAMEL 
for the group of TARP institutions. The combination of the latter two findings provides evidence 
that banks follow a TBTF management strategy. Taking as granted that the systemic importance 
of a financial company is closely linked to its size, we claim that a bank has the tendency to 
become larger not only because this will potentially lead to the improvement of its performance, 
but also because an implicit bailout guarantee is in place by the authorities in case of a financial 
debacle. On the whole, the net effect of bank size on performance and risk as reflected in the sum 
of the coefficients on SIZE, SIZESQ, and SIZEGR is clearly positive regardless of the level of 
bank soundness under scrutiny. This reveals a long-run relationship between size and 
performance.  
     As regards systemic size, this is found to be negatively associated with bank performance, 
albeit the coefficient on SYSTSIZE is statistically significant only for the assisted institutions. 
The explanation we provide relies on the rationale that a change in the absolute size of a bank 
entails a change in its systemic size. As described above, banks have strong incentives to become 
larger as this, inter alia, has a positive impact on their overall performance. Nevertheless, when a 
bank achieves a TBTF status in the sense that its failure is expected to have destabilising 
consequences on the entire system, this exerts a reverse effect on its performance. Managers 
seem to be aware that even if their banks perform relatively poorly after becoming systemically 
important, authorities will rescue these banks if needed. This sort of bank management strategy 
forces the system to consider large-scale bailouts like it has been the case in the recent crisis.  
     Market concentration is found to positively affect the performance of banks, where the impact 
is lower for TARP recipients and higher for failed banks. We also report an improvement in the 
performance of banks due to M&As, showing that banks can expand their market shares and can 
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better exploit economies of scale and scope via mergers. As a result, they can earn higher rents, 
boost their profits, and improve their overall performance. This result remains unchanged across 
the three different banking groups we examine. The combination of the aforementioned findings 
illustrates that a more concentrated banking industry consists of entities of greater performance 
and safer portfolios of assets. This implies that market concentration through M&As can be 
beneficial for the stability of the system. Two main arguments have been put forward in support 
of the view that concentration reduces fragility thus strengthening the stability of the system. 
First, Porter (1979) showed that concentrated banking systems might enhance market power and 
boost bank profits. High profits provide a buffer against adverse shocks and increase the charter 
value of banks thereby lowering the incentives for bank owners and managers to take excessive 
risk; this, in turn, reduces banking sector fragility. Second, it is broadly argued in the literature 
that it is easier to monitor a restricted number of banks in a concentrated banking market than to 
monitor a large number of banks in a dispersed market. Subsequently, bank supervision is more 
effective and fragility less pronounced in concentrated banking systems.  
     As expected, the impact of the late 2000s financial crisis captured by the binary variable CR1 
on bank performance is clearly negative. This holds true especially for the failed and rescued 
institutions; healthy banks are found to have been affected to a lesser extent from the crisis. It is 
widely accepted that economic performance has a considerable effect on the demand and supply 
of banking services. More precisely, high levels of banking activity are generally related to 
favourable economic conditions like price stability and economic development. In this context, 
the macroeconomic environment is largely considered to have an impact on the overall 
performance of banks. Indeed, economic growth (GDP) is documented as having a positive 
influence on CAMEL, meaning that recession has a negative impact on bank performance which 
confirms the previous result about the effect of the crisis on the banking system. 
      
4.2. The ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’ threshold size 
We can now proceed to investigate whether and to what extent size plays a role in determining 
the effects of bank performance on bank failure probability. Put differently, we wish to establish 
a threshold size which links bank performance to the likelihood of bank failure with the purpose 
to test our TSTS hypothesis. To this aim, we resort to Hansen’s (1999) threshold estimation 
technique which presupposes the use of a balanced data set. For this reason, we construct a 
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balanced sample that consists of 5,231 failed and healthy U.S. commercial and savings banks. 
The variables we employ in our analysis are the same with those used in eq. 2 (their description 
can be found in Appendix A). The likelihood of bank failure in eq. 8 below is denoted by Pr(𝐹𝐴𝐼𝐿)𝑖𝑡; IF is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the argument is true, and 0 
otherwise. Our model (eq. 8) allows us to investigate whether, and if so, at what level of bank 
size there is a statistically significant change in the coefficient of CAMEL and how this affects 
the bank failure likelihood. 
 Pr(𝐹𝐴𝐼𝐿)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐼𝐹(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 < 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐼𝐹(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 >    𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛼3𝛨𝛨𝛪𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑅1𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (8) 
 
Table 6 
The TSTS threshold size: regression results. This table 
presents the estimation results of eq. 8. The dependent 
variable is the probability of bank failure. The main 
explanatory variables include bank size (SIZE), and bank 
performance (CAMEL) which is composed of bank capital 
strength (CAP1), asset quality (CREDLOSS1), the quality of 
bank management (MNGEXP1), earnings strength (ROA), and 
bank liquidity (LQDT1). The set of controls includes banking 
market concentration (HHI), a dummy variable (MA) which 
accounts for M&A transactions, a crisis dummy variable 
(CR1), and the level of economic growth (GDP). A 
description of each variable and the associated data sources 
are included in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics are reported next to coefficient estimates. 
 Variables   Coefficient value t-statistics 
 constant  0.95     1.21 
 SIZE below  
 threshold  4.94     1.87** 
 SIZE above 
 threshold -2.08    -2.35*** 
 HHI -1.39    -1.41 
 MA -0.78    -1.50 
 CR1   2.65     3.51*** 
 GDP  -3.98    -4.67*** 
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Obs (N)   5,231  
𝑅2   0.24  
TSTS threshold level of SIZE: $1,096,342,877 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively 
for a two-tailed distribution 
 
     The regression results in Table 6 lend support to our hypothesis that the impact of bank 
performance on failure probability largely depends on bank size. Indeed, we find that CAMEL 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient if SIZE is smaller than $1,096,342,877, 
whereas the coefficient is negative and significant when SIZE is larger than $1,096,342.877. 
Markedly, the mean total assets of the failed banks during the crisis is $1.2 billion.7 It is also 
worth noting that community banks are defined as those banks with less than $1 billion in assets 
(as earlier noted). Both these figures are very close to our estimated TSTS threshold size for the 
U.S. banking industry. 
     Small, community banks have long played a key role in the U.S. economy, providing loans 
and other financial services to households and small businesses within their local markets. 
However, the crisis took a heavy toll on these banks: approximately 400 small banks failed and 
several hundred remain on the problem bank list which is maintained by the FDIC. Our 
explanation to this phenomenon is that it may not be optimal for supervisory and regulatory 
authorities to rescue banks whose size is below the level of $1,096,342.877 in total assets. This is 
in line with the findings of Goodhart and Huang (2005) and Gong and Jones (2010) according to 
which the optimal bailout policy for authorities is one which considers only large-sized banks for 
potential rescues, disregarding small banks as they are of little or no importance for the system as 
a whole. Very importantly, small banks, apart from viewed as being TSTS by the authorities, 
also perform poorly in relative terms. Indeed, size has a significantly direct impact on 
performance ratings, meaning that the overall performance of community banks is weaker 
compared to that of larger banking enterprises. 
                                                 
7 The bankruptcy of Washington Mutual Bank with $307 billion assets has been recorded as the biggest commercial 
bank failure in the crisis and is thus treated as an outlier here. 
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     In addition, we claim that the reported TSTS threshold size can have a considerable impact on 
the performance and risk-taking decisions of bank managers. It is an undisputed fact that 
managers have the potential to influence the performance of their banks through their decisions 
regarding the composition and size of the banks’ balance sheet and the quality of their oversight 
of the banks’ operations. In case a manager knows that his bank is considered by the authorities 
to be TSTS and hence is not protected by bailout policies, he may turn to resort to riskier 
investment decisions. Indeed, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010), in a theoretical framework, 
establish a link between size and performance by showing that small banks which are not 
considered by the authorities to be systemically important take higher risk, especially when the 
bailout probability of the banks which are protected by the system is increased.  
 
5. Robustness analysis 
To test the robustness of our results, we use a set of alternative variables to construct CAMEL 
ratings. Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of Tier 1&2 regulatory bank capital to risk-
based assets (CAP2); asset quality is proxied by loan loss reserves and loan charge-offs divided 
by total loans (CREDLOSS2); the returns on equity are utilised to proxy banks’ earnings (ROE); 
and the ratio of liquid deposits to total deposits (LQDT2) is employed in our robustness analysis 
to measure the degree of liquidity of the sample banking firms. As regards Management 
expertise, this is proxied by a measure of bank managerial efficiency (MNGEXP2). To calculate 
MNGEXP2, we employ the input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. DEA may 
be computed either as input- or output-oriented. Input-oriented DEA shows by how much input 
quantities can be reduced without varying the output quantities produced. Output-oriented DEA 
assesses by how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the 
input quantities used. The two measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale, 
but give different values under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, both output- and input-
oriented models identify the same set of efficient/inefficient bank management.8  
     Let us assume that for the N sample banks there exist S inputs producing R outputs. Hence, 
each bank i uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted by 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥1𝑖 ,  𝑥2𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑠𝑖)∈𝑅+𝑆  to produce 
a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted by 𝑦𝑖 = (𝑦1𝑖 ,  𝑦2𝑖 , … , 𝑦𝑟𝑖)∈𝑅+𝑅, where: i = 1, 2,…, N; r = 
1, 2,…, R; s = 1, 2,…, S. Production technology, {( , ) :  can produce y}F y x x= , describes the set 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed discussion, see Coelli et al. (2005). 
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of feasible input-output vectors, and the input sets of production technology, 
( ) { : ( , ) }L y x y x F= ∈  describe the sets of input vectors that are feasible for each output vector. 
To measure the variable returns to scale managerial cost efficiency (MNGEXP2), we resort to 
the following input-oriented DEA model, where inputs are minimised and outputs are held at 
constant levels: 
 
           𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2∗ = min(𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2),   𝑠. 𝑡.                 (9) 
 
                                    ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑠 ≤ (𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2)(𝑥1𝑠)𝑁𝑖=1                 (10) 
                  ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑟 ≥ 𝑦1𝑟𝑁𝑖=1               (11) 
      ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 1𝑁𝑖=1                (12) 
      𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                            (13) 
 
Bank1 represents one of the N banks under evaluation for i = 1; x1s and y1r are the sth input and 
rth output for bank1, respectively. 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2∗ stands for the optimal managerial efficiency 
score in that 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2∗ = 1. In such a case, the current input levels cannot be proportionally 
improved given output levels, indicating that bank1 lies upon the cost efficiency frontier. If 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃2 < 1, then bank1 represents an inefficient bank; MNGEXP2 gives the managerial 
efficiency score of bank1. Finally, λ is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at which 
the total observations are conducted. Note that this approach, through the convexity constraint 
1λΣ =  (which accounts for variable returns to scale) forms a convex hull of intersecting planes, 
since the frontier production plane is defined by combining some actual production planes. 
     An important concern in the empirical estimation of efficiency is the definition of bank inputs 
and outputs. This is strongly related to the specific role that deposits play in the operation of 
financial institutions. The banking literature addresses this issue by using two main approaches: 
the intermediation or asset approach and the production or value-added approach.9 Under the 
former one, financial firms are viewed as intermediaries which transform deposits and purchased 
funds into loans and other earning assets. This is to say, liabilities and physical factors are treated 
as inputs, whereas assets are treated as outputs. The production approach, on the other hand, 
                                                 
9 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
approaches.  
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regards financial institutions as producers of services for account holders, measuring output with 
the number of transactions or documents processed over a given period of time. Therefore, 
deposits are encompassed in the output and not in the input vector, which exclusively consists of 
physical entities. 
     Berger and Humphrey (1991), however, propose a third approach that, contrary to the above 
two approaches, captures the dual role of banking operations. In fact, the so-called ‘modified 
production approach’ can be viewed as a combination of the ‘intermediation’ and ‘production’ 
approaches, as it enables the consideration of both the input and output characteristics of deposits 
in the cost (or profit) functions. More specifically, the price of deposits is considered to be an 
input, whilst the volume of deposits is accounted as an output. Under this specification, banks 
are assumed to provide intermediation and loan services as well as payment, liquidity, and 
safekeeping services at the same time. 
     In our analysis, we adopt the ‘modified production approach’ to define inputs and outputs. 
The reason of doing so is because this approach moves one step further describing the activities 
of banks in a more complete setting thereby providing a closer representation of reality. We 
specify five variable outputs in total of which traditional banking activities are captured by three 
outputs, namely total loans (y1), which is the sum of commercial, industrial and real estate loans; 
other earning assets (y2); and total retail deposits (y3) measured by the sum of time, demand, and 
savings deposits. Non-traditional activities are proxied by two outputs: the non-interest income 
(y4) calculated as the sum of commission, fee, and trading income, and the value of Off-Balance-
Sheet (OBS) items (y5). Regarding inputs, we consider borrowed funds, labour, and physical 
capital in our analysis. The price of borrowed funds (x1) is defined as the ratio of total interest 
expense scaled by total deposits and other purchased funds; the price of labour (x2) is calculated 
by dividing total salaries and benefits by the number of full-time employees; and the price of 
physical capital (x3) equals expenses of premises and equipment divided by premises and fixed 
assets. All variables employed in the robustness checks as well as the sources used to construct 
these variables are described in Appendix A.   
     We proceed to examine the robustness of the performance-risk-size nexus in the U.S. banking 
industry allowing this time the slope coefficient on size to vary across the U.S. states. The 
sample consists of 7,711 U.S. commercial and savings banking institutions divided into the four 
size clusters denoted by k. Moreover, CAMEL is introduced with a negative sign in eq. 14 for the 
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reasons which have been discussed in our baseline analysis. The null hypothesis 𝐻0 we test 
remains the same, i.e., the slope coefficients on bank size are equal to zero for every size class. 
The model we examine is the following: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿����������𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑎𝑗𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑏𝑘𝑑𝑗𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘         (14) 
 
Table 7 reports the regression results of eq. 14. As we can see, the null hypothesis cannot be 
accepted meaning that size is indeed a fundamental determinant of bank performance and risk-
taking. In line with the outcome of our mainline regression analysis (see Table 3), the 
coefficients on size dummies increase monotonically moving up from the smallest size group to 
the largest one. This result reflects large-scale diversification, economies of scale and scope, and 
better access to capital markets for larger banks. On the other hand, smaller banks are regarded 
as being relatively less competent in investing in technology and risk management systems. On 
the whole, smaller banks underperform compared to their larger peers. Our findings remain 
largely unchanged when we interchangeably normalise the coefficients on Small, Large, and 
Extra-large binary variables instead of that on Medium.  
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Table 7 
Bank performance-risk-size nexus: robustness 
check. This table presents the estimated coefficients 
of the bank size dummy variable for all four size 
categories k (i.e., Small, Medium, Large, and Extra-
large) based on eq. 14. The dependent variable is 
bank performance (CAMEL), which is composed of 
bank capital strength (CAP2), asset quality 
(CREDLOSS2), the quality of bank management 
(MNGEXP2), earnings strength (ROE), and bank 
liquidity (LQDT2). A description of each variable 
and the relevant data sources are included in 
Appendix A. White robust standard errors are used 
to correct for heteroskedasticity in the residuals.   
 
Size Coeff. 
Value (𝒃𝒌) 
 
t-stat 
Bank size (k)   
Small 0.22 2.27*** 
Medium 0.00  
Large 0.36 2.52*** 
Extra-large 0.69 2.70*** 
   
Obs (N) 7,711  
𝑅2 0.14  
F-statistics 14.58  
                                        ***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of  
                                        significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
     We now move to explore the robustness of our results obtained by the regression of eq. 2. 
Together with the alternative CAMEL ratings, we define and use the crisis dummy CR2 instead 
of CR1, which takes the value of one in 2008q3 when Lehman Brothers collapsed and remains 
equal to one thereafter. Additionally, instead of GDP, we employ the change in the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to control for variations in the level of prices; inflation data are 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. Lastly, we 
construct a dummy variable (LISTED) to account for listed and non-listed banking firms in our 
sample. We run eq. 15 and the results we obtain are presented in Table 8 below.   
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𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +𝛼5𝛨𝛨𝛪𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝑅2𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (15) 
 
Table 8 
Bank performance-risk-size nexus: robustness check. This table presents the estimation results of eq.15. 
The dependent variable is bank performance (CAMEL) which is composed of bank capital strength (CAP2), 
asset quality (CREDLOSS2), the quality of bank management (MNGEXP2), earnings strength (ROE), and 
bank liquidity (LQDT2). The main explanatory variables are: bank size (SIZE), bank size squared 
(SIZESQ), bank size growth (SIZEGR), and systemic bank size (SYSTSIZE). All four size variables are 
lagged by one quarter to address possible endogeneity and simultaneity concerns between performance and 
size. The set of control variables includes banking market concentration (HHI), a dummy variable (MA) 
which accounts for M&A transactions, a crisis dummy variable (CR2), the price level (INF), and a dummy 
variable (LISTED) which accounts for listed banks. A description of each variable and the relevant data 
sources are included in Appendix A. Individual bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and state fixed effects 
are incorporated in the regression model. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported next to 
coefficient estimates. 
  Healthy Banks Failed banks Bailed out banks 
Variables Coef value t-stat Coef value t-stat Coef value t-stat 
constant  0.88  1.26 0.59 0.98 0.93 1.64* 
SIZE  0.89  1.93** 0.31 1.86** 1.38 2.03*** 
SIZESQ  2.10  1.87** 1.70 1.89** 2.32 2.01*** 
SIZEGR  3.21  1.88**  2.11  2.31***  4.43  2.99*** 
SYSTSIZE -1.09 -1.22 -1.11 -1.17 -1.88 -1.81** 
HHI  1.28  2.41***  1.81  1.82**  1.03  1.94** 
MA   0.72  1.99***  0.68  1.90**  0.90  2.34*** 
CR2 -1.82 -3.77*** -4.56 -4.83*** -2.66 -3.31*** 
INF   1.83   2.01***   1.57   1.99***  1.65  1.86** 
LISTED   0.14   1.73**   0.10   1.61*  0.21  1.99*** 
Obs (N) 6,481    432    798  
 𝑅2  0.17    0.20    0.19  
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Individual fixed 
effects  Yes    Yes    Yes  
State fixed 
effects  Yes    Yes    Yes  
Time fixed 
effects  Yes    Yes    Yes  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution 
 
     The regression results corroborate the conclusions reached in the relevant baseline analysis. 
More concretely, the composite CAMEL ratings of the sample banks are positively and highly 
significantly linked to SIZE, SIZESQ, and SIZEGR, reflecting the long-run relationship that holds 
between size, performance, and risk in the U.S. banking market. Furthermore, SYSTSIZE is 
found to exert a significantly negative impact on performance, which suggests that the managers 
of banks which implicitly attain an important position in the system based (among other factors) 
on their size, cease to focus on the further improvement of the performance and risk profile of 
their banks following a TBTF management strategy.  
     The results of our robustness analysis provide further support to the view that concentration in 
the banking industry through M&A activities is beneficial for the performance and risk-taking 
behaviour of banks. We also find that the operation of listed banks is associated with superior 
performance when compared to that of unlisted banks. We interpret this finding as evidence of 
the higher degree of pressure for better performance that listed firms generally face. It is 
established in the literature (see, e.g., Iannotta et al., 2007) that exchange-listed banks face 
greater scrutiny through monitoring not only from regulators and supervisors, but also from 
stakeholders, financial analysts, and market participants. At the same time, listed banks, in 
contrast to the unlisted ones, have to deal with increased reporting and other relevant 
requirements, which create significant additional costs in their operation. Lastly, we report that 
favourable economic conditions, as echoed in the increased level of prices, positively affect the 
functioning of banks. This finding is corroborated by the negative effect of crisis on 
performance. 
     To test the robustness of the TSTS hypothesis we have posed, we run eq. 16 which relies on 
the updated set of variables described above: 
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Pr(𝐹𝐴𝐼𝐿)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐼𝐹(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 < 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑡𝐼𝐹(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 >
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) + 𝛼3𝛨𝛨𝛪𝑡+𝛼4𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑅2𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (16) 
Table 9 
The TSTS threshold size: robustness check. This table 
presents the estimation results of eq. 16. The dependent 
variable is the probability of bank failure. The main 
explanatory variables include bank size (SIZE), and bank 
performance (CAMEL) which is composed of bank capital 
strength (CAP2), asset quality (CREDLOSS2), the quality of 
bank management (MNGEXP2), earnings strength (ROE), and 
bank liquidity (LQDT2). The set of controls includes banking 
market concentration (HHI), a dummy variable (MA) which 
accounts for M&A transactions, a crisis dummy variable 
(CR2), the price level (INF), and a dummy variable (LISTED) 
which accounts for listed banks. A description of each 
variable and the associated data sources are included in 
Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported 
next to coefficient estimates. 
Variables    Coefficient value t-statistics 
constant 1.02         1.18 
SIZE below 
threshold 4.45 1.99*** 
SIZE above 
threshold -2.76 -2.40*** 
HHI -1.18         -1.32 
MA -0.64         -1.67* 
CR2   2.42   3.74*** 
INF  -1.57 -1.88** 
LISTED -0.43         -1.67* 
   
Obs (N)  5,184  
𝑅2  0.22  
TSTS threshold level of SIZE: $1,067,193,709 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively 
for a two-tailed distribution 
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The regression results in Table 9 show that CAMEL has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient if SIZE is larger than $1,067,193,709, whereas the coefficient is negative when SIZE 
is smaller than $1,067,193,709. Therefore, we can postulate that it may not be in the interest of 
authorities to rescue banks whose size is below some particular threshold level. This time the 
threshold level is found to be equal to $1,067,193,709, which is very close to the one we reported 
in our mainline regression analysis. Moreover, the new asset size threshold is also very similar to 
the cut-off size of community banking institutions and to the average size of the banks that went 
bankrupt in the recent financial crisis (if, again, Washington Mutual Bank is excluded).  
 
6. Conclusions 
It is a common place that during financial crises, like the one started in 2007, authorities provide 
substantial financial support to some problem banking institutions while at the same time let 
several others to go bankrupt. Is this happening because some particular banks are considered 
important and big enough to save, whereas some others are perceived as being ‘Too-Small-To-
Survive’? Is, indeed, the size of banks the fundamental factor that makes the authorities to treat 
them differently, or it is also that some banks perform poorly and are not capable of withstanding 
some considerable shocks whatsoever? Our study has made an attempt to provide some concrete 
answers to these questions with the purpose to fill part of the void in the existing literature. 
     Size is found to be a crucial determinant of performance and risk-taking in banking 
independent of whether our empirical analysis takes place in the short-run, or in the long-run. To 
be more specific, we are able to establish a direct link between size and performance by showing 
that smaller banks perform relatively worse compared to their larger counterparts also taking 
riskier decisions. We interpret this result by arguing that small banking firms may not be in a 
position to fully exploit the technological developments that took place in the past years and to 
succeed in operating under increased scale and scope economies. Furthermore, the capacity of 
small-sized banks to efficiently diversify risk is narrow compared to that of larger banks due to 
the lower number of customers they have, the geographical concentration of their activities, and 
the limited scale and scope of products and services they offer. On the whole, the smaller a bank 
is, the poorer its performance and the riskier its portfolio. 
     We find robust evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship that holds between performance, 
risk, and size in the U.S. banking industry. We also document that when a bank grows in size, 
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this has a further positive impact on its overall performance. From the whole range of banks we 
examine in terms of soundness, those that were bailed out during the crisis are found to have 
stronger incentives to increase their asset size. This finding suggests that a bank has the tendency 
to become larger not only because this will potentially lead to the improvement of its 
performance, but also because an implicit bailout guarantee is in place by the authorities in case 
of a financial debacle. Overall, a long-run positive relationship between size and performance is 
established in our paper regardless of the level of bank soundness under examination.  
     Importantly, we lend support to the TSTS hypothesis we pose according to which the impact 
of bank performance on failure probability strongly depends on bank size. We estimated a TSTS 
threshold size for the U.S. banking industry, which is really close to the cut-off size of the U.S. 
community banking institutions and to the average asset size of the banks that went bankrupt in 
the late 2000s financial crisis. We postulate that it may not be optimal for authorities to rescue 
banks whose size is below the reported TSTS threshold. This threshold size can affect the 
decisions of bank managers and influence the performance of their banks. In case a manager 
knows that his bank is considered by the authorities to be TSTS and, hence, is not protected by 
bailout policies, he may turn to resort to riskier investment decisions. Along the same lines, the 
behaviour of depositors, potential borrowers, and investors in a TSTS banking institution is 
expected to divert from the average behaviour.  
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Appendix A: Variables and data sources 
This Appendix presents all variables that we use in the baseline econometric analysis as well as in the robustness checks. The abbreviation of each variable 
and the sources we use to collect the data are reported. 
Variable  Abbreviation Definition Data source 
    CAMEL components    
Capital adequacy 
CAP1 The ratio of total equity capital to total bank assets 
Call Reports, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago 
CAP2 The ratio of Tier 1 & 2 regulatory capital to risk-based assets 
   
Asset quality 
CREDLOSS1 The ratio of provisions for credit losses to total loans and leases 
CREDLOSS2 The sum of loan loss reserves and loan charge-offs divided by total loans 
   
Management expertise 
MNGEXP1 The ratio of total operating income to income generating assets 
MNGEXP2 Managerial efficiency 
   
Earnings strength 
ROA The ratio of total income to total assets 
ROE The ratio of total income to total equity 
   
Liquidity 
LQDT1 The ratio of cash & cash equivalents and federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to repurchase to total assets 
LQDT2 The ratio of liquid deposits to total deposits 
   
Right-hand-side variables    
Bank size 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Call Reports, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago     SIZESQ The squared root of the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
SIZEGR The growth rate of the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
42 
 
SYSTSIZE Sample bank’s liabilities-to-GDP ratio 
Call Reports, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago 
& Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
Banking market concentration HHI The sum of squares of the market share of each sample bank Call Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
M&A deals MA A dummy variable which is equal to unity in the quarter q that  bank i has been involved in some M&A transaction FFIEC 
Listed banks LISTED A dummy variable which is equal to unity if bank i is listed on the exchange market 
Call Reports, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Crisis dummy 
CR1 A dummy variable which is equal to 1 in 2007q3 and thereafter  
CR2 A dummy variable which is equal to 1 in 2008q3 and therafter  
Macroeconomic conditions 
GDP GDP output gap 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
CPI The quarterly change in U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor 
 
